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Summary: 
Overall the monetary pillar of the EMU project has worked well so that it is incorrect to speak of a 'euro' crisis though it is at the epicentre of the present 
crisis. The origins of the problems it is facing have more to do with the economic component, particularly because of the breach of budgetary rules which 
points to a failure of politics. Hence the solution must be political, namely a strong commitment by governments to achieve balanced budgets and 
implement structural reforms so as to lay the basis for improved competitiveness, job creation and sustainable growth. 
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Introduction 
The title I have chosen for my remarks may sound 
provocative or even simplistic given the complexity of 
the subject, but I have done so for a reason. My 
purpose is not indeed to suggest that there is a 
straightforward answer to the question, but rather to 
permit a better focus on the two major actors in the 
current scenario: the governments of the euro area 
countries, on the one hand,  and their common 
currency, on the other. Their predicament, which I 
shall discuss first, has been aggravated by various 
other actors whose behaviour, in a world of globally 
integrated economies and financial markets, has 
helped to transform a weakness that was latent in 
the design of Europe’s Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) into a sovereign debt crisis that is 
threatening  the very existence of the euro itself. 
 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) – the 
rationale 
From the perspective of economic theory, the 
decision to start Stage III of EMU in January 1999 was 
unprecedented. It was nothing less than an act of 
faith in the capacity of governments to reconcile their 
agreement to give up their national currencies and 
monetary policies to a supranational central bank 
with their decision to retain national control over 
fiscal and economic policies. This asymmetry in the 
macroeconomic policy framework represented a 
major challenge because the euro would in effect be 
a currency without a State. Moreover, it was clear 
that not all the eleven countries that were allowed to 
enter EMU satisfied the convergence criteria laid 
down in the Maastricht Treaty.  
 
EMU did not then have the characteristics of an 
optimum currency area and that decision was clearly 
taken on political rather than economic grounds. This 
led many knowledgeable observers to predict the 
experiment’s early demise. Milton Friedman, for 
example, anticipated that the monetary union would 
collapse within five years.1 
 
Altogether, therefore, the omens were not 
favourable at all. And yet, when viewed against this 
background the track record looks surprisingly good. 
With regard to employment, for example, some 14 
million jobs have been created in the euro area since 
the launch of the single currency, compared with 
around 7 million in the United States, a more 
integrated single market of comparable size. As for 
the monetary dimension of EMU, the euro has 
retained its value and even today remains stronger 
against the dollar than in its early days. It has become 
established as the second most important global 
currency after the dollar and is roughly at par with it 
as a unit for the denomination of credit. The euro has 
also become a major reserve currency.  
 
At the same time, the euro’s central bank, the ECB, 
has achieved its primary objective. Annual inflation 
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has averaged 2.0% since the birth of the currency, in 
spite of the considerable fluctuations in commodity 
prices, especially oil prices, in the recent past. In 
addition, confidence in the euro is reflected in the 
fact that long-term inflation expectations have 
remained anchored around the ECB’s definition of 
price stability and are currently at 1.8%. Stable 
inflation expectations are central to economic 
prosperity since they allow businesses and 
households to plan ahead without concern about 
price and cost shocks.  
 
Overall, therefore, the monetary pillar of the EMU 
project has worked well so that it is incorrect to 
speak of a ‘euro’ crisis.  The euro may well be at the 
epicentre of the current turmoil, but the origins of 
the problem have more to do with the economic 
component of EMU, particularly because of the 
breach of the budgetary rules.2  This is an aspect of 
what I have called ‘the failure of politics’.  
 
At this point it is pertinent to recall that the tendency 
of governments to run deficits and to shift the 
resulting debt burden onto future generations 
predates the euro.  For example, deficits of around 4-
5% of GDP were widespread in the countries that 
now form the euro area so that the average stock of 
debt increased from around 35% of GDP in 1980 to 
75% by the mid-nineties.3  
 
Imprudent fiscal policies can have detrimental effects 
on growth by pushing up interest rates, thereby 
discouraging private investment.  The deficit bias is 
further exacerbated in a monetary union due to the 
elimination of exchange rate risk and the narrowing 
of risk premia, which, prior to the creation of the 
single currency, used to impose an element of market 
discipline on profligate countries. 
 
Such indiscipline also has negative implications for 
monetary policy, as fiscal expansion can boost 
aggregate demand, thereby giving rise to inflationary 
pressures.  Of even greater concern, persistent 
increases in the debt level can lead to the fear that 
government spending would ultimately be financed 
by money creation, with a detrimental impact on 
prices.  
 
Here it must be acknowledged that the founding 
fathers were not unaware of these dangers. The 
Maastricht Treaty in fact laid down some basic rules 
governing national fiscal policy and the avoidance of 
excessive deficits. Then in 1997 the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP), which, along with the European 
Central Bank (ECB) constitutes the institutional 
framework of EMU, set out detailed provisions of 
both a preventive and a corrective nature. For 
example, it prohibits fiscal deficits from exceeding 3% 
of GDP.  More importantly, the SGP stipulates that 
countries should aim to balance their budgets over 
the economic cycle, by running surpluses in good 
times in order to have ample room for manoeuvre 
during downturns, allowing automatic fiscal 
stabilizers full play without breaching the reference 
value.  
 
Finally, apart from adhering to the underlying value 
of fiscal prudence, countries were expected to 
coordinate their economic policies and adopt market-
oriented reforms. This, in turn, would lead to 
sustained macroeconomic convergence among euro 
area countries and help prevent the accumulation of 
imbalances.  In addition, an ambitious agenda of 
supply-side initiatives, the Lisbon Strategy, was 
devised to expand the EU’s growth potential. 
 
The economic pillar of EMU: the failure of politics 
In brief, therefore, the absence of monetary and 
exchange rate independence at the national level 
placed the onus on prudent budgetary, wage and 
structural policies.  Unfortunately, it was already 
becoming evident by the middle of the past decade 
that national policies were not always compatible 
with the requirements of a monetary union.  The 
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financial crisis that erupted in 2008 has accentuated 
this weakness.  
 
On the fiscal front, both the preventive and 
corrective arms of the SGP failed to discipline 
governments and several countries registered deficits 
even in good times.  By 2003, five of the twelve euro 
area countries were in breach of the SGP.  This 
disappointing record undermined the credibility of 
the Pact, which became most apparent when the 
ECOFIN Council decided to put on hold the excessive 
deficit procedure for France and Germany in 2003, 
under pressure from these same two countries. It is 
indeed ironic that Germany, whose Chancellor at the 
time stated publicly in a letter to the Financial Times 
that his country would not have its fiscal policy 
decided in ‘Brussels’, had been the most ardent 
proponent of the SGP and is today preaching the 
virtues of fiscal rigour to highly indebted countries as 
the only solution to the crisis. 
 
At the same time, euro area countries have also 
diverged in their competitive positions and in their 
external balances.4 Some countries registered strong 
gains in price and cost competitiveness relative to the 
other members, while others showed a substantial 
deterioration.  Large and persistent divergences were 
particularly pronounced in unit labour costs (ULC): 
between 1999 and 2007, cumulative ULC growth was 
a modest 2.3% in Germany and 5.9% in Austria, but 
exceeded 20% in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.5  
 
These differences in cost competitiveness were in 
turn often reflected in marked divergences in real 
effective exchange rates and in current account 
positions. The latter reflected the build-up of 
domestic imbalances, evident in the incompatibility 
of rapid wage growth with sluggish gains in 
productivity, strong credit expansion and asset 
bubbles.  Capital inflows led to an unsustainable 
accumulation of private sector debt in countries with 
current account deficits, while large current account 
surpluses, especially in Germany, reflected structural 
weaknesses in domestic demand. Such imbalances 
are a source of concern in a monetary union since the 
single monetary policy cannot address country-
specific differences.   
 
More worryingly, the adoption of the euro seemed to 
reduce the political will in some countries to pursue 
much needed reforms, for instance to open up labour 
and product markets to competition and reduce costs 
for businesses, thereby raising the growth potential 
of their economies.  This was mostly evident in the 
failure to reach the targets set in the Lisbon Strategy.  
The single market was already under pressure even 
before the onset of the crisis, as shown by the 
opposition to the proposed liberalization of cross-
border takeovers and to the opening up of the 
services sector to EU-wide competition. According to 
Business Europe, the pan-European employers’ 
association, impediments to the free movement of 
labour, capital, goods and services have cost 
businesses between 2% and 15% of their turnover.6 
 
Against this background, it should be easier to 
distinguish between the euro as a currency and the 
problem of financial stability in the euro area. The 
latter has been undermined by mismanagement at 
the political level. Helmut Schmidt, a former German 
Chancellor, expressed this view in much stronger 
language last October at a farewell event for the 
President of the ECB, Jean- Claude Trichet, when he 
said, ‘All the talk of a so-called “euro crisis” is just the 
idle chatter of politicians and journalists. What we 
have, in fact, is a crisis of the ability of the European 
Union’s political bodies to act. This glaring weakness 
of action is a much greater threat to the future of 
Europe than the excessive debt levels of individual 
euro area countries’.7 
 
Sub-prime mortgages, the collapse of confidence 
and the global financial crisis 
It is indeed arguable that in a pre-2008 world of 
sustained economic growth, the euro area’s debt 
problem would have been manageable given time 
and the adoption of corrective policies prescribed 
under the SGP’s corrective arm. But, as I noted in my 
introduction, a number of unfavourable 
developments have intervened to magnify that 
problem immeasurably. 
 
It all started in 2008 with the eruption of a global 
financial crisis of unprecedented proportions. It is 
now clear that risks had been building up over a 
number of years. Some derived from the fact that 
corporate governance, risk management, market 
infrastructures for derivative products as well as 
supervisory practices and regulatory frameworks had 
not kept pace with the process of financial 
innovation. Others have been associated with an 
overly accommodative monetary policy at the global 
level, particularly in the United States.  
 
The initial trigger of the crisis was the securitisation 
of sub-prime mortgages and the associated originate 
and distribute model. These structured products 
found ready buyers, but there were significant 
misaligned incentives underlying the model: there 
were manifest conflicts of interest; originators and 
brokers had limited interest in ensuring continued 
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monitoring of these products; and credit ratings were 
inflated, conveying a false sense of security about 
products that proved to be highly toxic. A euphoric 
bubble thus developed, based, in Alan Greenspan’s 
words, on ‘the complexity of the interactions of asset 
markets and the economy’, and which concealed a 
massive global under-pricing of risk.  
 
Market participants seem to have been aware of the 
growing risks, but were unwilling to retrench. You 
might recall Citibank’s Chuck Prince’s memorable 
words during the onset of the crisis that ‘as long as 
the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. 
We’re still dancing’. Market players failed to 
appreciate the speed at which demand could 
evaporate and risk aversion could increase. This soon 
resulted in record-high risk premia, seized-up 
interbank markets, acute liquidity and credit 
shortages and bank failures. As banks sought to 
restructure their balance sheets, the cost of financing 
rose and credit standards tightened such that 
borrowers found it increasingly hard to obtain 
finance. The resultant contraction in private 
consumption and investment produced a sharp 
decline in world trade. All these factors helped to 
push major economies, including that of the euro 
area, into recession. 
 
But perhaps the largest single casualty, and the one 
with the most far-reaching consequences, was 
confidence. This development has been cogently 
described by the former Group Chairman of HSBC 
Holdings plc and now a minister in the British 
Government, Stephen Green, in the introduction to 
his recent book “Good Value”. He recalls his thoughts 
one day in April 2008 at a conference on the shores 
of Lake Como against the background of an unfolding 
global financial crisis. He describes that time as one 
of those moments in history when it seems as if the 
tectonic plates are shifting, striking at the roots of 
what we had taken for granted for a quarter of a 
century. Green wrote, ‘There has been a massive 
breakdown of trust: trust in the financial system, trust 
in bankers, trust in business, trust in business leaders, 
trust in politicians, trust in the media, trust in the 
whole process of globalization – all have been 
severely damaged,..8 
 
The policy response, risk aversion, speculation and 
the sovereign debt crisis 
In response to the crisis, governments adopted 
aggressive measures, including fiscal stimulus 
packages, bank recapitalisations and the provision of 
government guarantees, while central banks injected 
huge amounts of liquidity. This unprecedented fiscal 
and monetary policy intervention was necessary to 
avoid a financial meltdown and an economic 
depression.  The by-product, however, was a sharp 
increase in public debt, with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) describing the situation as 
‘wartime debt, without a war.’9 More importantly, 
financial markets – which had encouraged and 
financed government rescue packages at the time - 
became increasingly tense and volatile, and started 
to question the sustainability of the debt that had 
been incurred in the process. 
 
This scenario is currently being played out in a 
number of euro area countries, especially those that 
are highly indebted and depend on foreign investors 
to finance their budget deficits and debt rollovers. 
They are discovering that the discipline of the market 
is implacable. We have indeed been observing a 
perverse dynamic involving institutional investors, 
particularly bond fund managers, analysts and credit 
rating agencies, whose outcome has been a self-
fulfilling prophecy of a progressive widening of yield 
spreads and ratings downgrades in a mutually 
reinforcing cycle.  
 
One of the more glaring examples of this unusual 
behaviour was the downgrading of Portugal last 
summer by one rating agency just when that country 
had started to implement a medium-term 
adjustment programme negotiated and agreed with 
the Commission, the ECB and the IMF. On an earlier 
occasion another agency reduced its rating for 
Greece three days before the agreement with the 
IMF was concluded, without knowing the contents of 
the adjustment programme. Such decisions only 
serve to undermine investor confidence even further.  
 
Heightened investor risk aversion, however, 
whatever its origins, cannot alone explain certain 
market behaviour.  Speculation has also played a 
part. The deregulation of financial institutions, which 
started in the United States in the 1980s, combined 
with the development of complex structured 
products and reward systems for managers and 
traders that prioritized short-term profits created 
favourable conditions for financial speculation to 
become entrenched in the banking sector. It seems 
legitimate to argue, for example, that the debt crisis 
in Greece,  a country that accounts for just about 2% 
of the euro area GDP, would not have become a 
threat to the euro had it not been the object of a 
speculative attack by institutions from outside the 
euro area. 
 
The fact remains, nevertheless, that markets have 
proved more powerful than governments, a reality 
that the latter, however, have been reluctant to 
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acknowledge. They are exploiting a weakness that 
Otmar Issing, the architect of the ECB’s monetary 
policy, had already identified in his 2008 book “The 
Birth of the Euro”. Issing observed that ‘The 
economies of the Member States still have some way 
to go to satisfy the conditions necessary for monetary 
union to function properly. The political courage at 
the beginning needs to be complemented by the 
resolve to pursue the necessary reforms…..Fiscal 
policy has yet to demonstrate convincingly its full 
compliance with the self-imposed rules of the Stability 
and Growth Pact.’10  The situation has since 
deteriorated to the point that the markets are 
determining both the duration and the composition 
of governments. 
 
The way forward: – a political solution 
To conclude, therefore, it would appear that an 
eventual solution to what has become an existential 
crisis for the euro is likely to lie elsewhere than in the 
workings of the common currency itself. As I have 
tried to show, the monetary dimension of EMU has 
been implemented with relative success. But that, 
although necessary, is not sufficient.  As the late 
lamented Tommaso Padoa Schioppa, one of the 
founding members of the ECB’s Executive Board and 
a passionate believer in the European project, 
reminded us in his 2004 book, “The Euro and its 
Central Bank”, ‘Through history the strength and 
success of a currency have been closely related to the 
strength and success of the economic, social and 
political entity of which it was an expression, and not 
just to the skills and professionalism of its central 
bank.’11 
 
The challenge we face today, therefore, is how to 
cope with the absence of a full political union.  
However, since the achievement of deeper European 
integration is a slow-moving process and, as we are 
reminded daily, the financial markets are impatient 
and unforgiving, the priority should be to take all 
possible steps to shore up investor and consumer 
confidence. It is necessary to advance rapidly on all 
fronts. 
 
First, a strong commitment by governments to 
achieve balanced budgets and to implement 
structural reforms, backed by the announcement of 
specific measures to do so, would lay the basis for 
improved competitiveness, job creation and 
sustainable growth.  This is vital for if the nominal 
growth rate does not exceed the interest rate on the 
debt, it is not possible to ease debt burdens. This 
thinking underlies the approach already taken in 
Ireland and Portugal and soon to be adopted by 
Greece, Spain and Italy. This time around, compliance 
is to be ensured through stricter monitoring by the 
Commission. 
 
Reconciling reforms and lower debt ratios with 
growth and equity under current global conditions, 
however, is an impossible task. Fiscal austerity will 
further compress economic activity in the short term 
and, if protracted, is likely to prove socially and 
politically unsustainable. Demand in these countries, 
therefore, needs to be supported by a symmetrical 
fiscal stimulus in the surplus countries and a more 
accommodative stance by the ECB. 
 
At the same time, markets need to be persuaded that 
liquidity problems will not become solvency 
problems.  This requires the urgent implementation 
of G20 and EU decisions already taken with regard to 
such issues as economic governance, the regulation 
and supervision of banking systems, the 
recapitalization of banks and more transparent rating 
agency behaviour.  
 
To give but one example, it took more than a year for 
EU leaders to decide to make available the full 
guarantee amount of the bailout fund, the EFSF, for 
indebted countries. A further month has passed since 
the EU summit agreed on leveraging the resources of 
the fund by a factor of up to four or five and still the 
fund is not fully operational. The markets are not 
convinced by words. Statements of intent must be 
backed by concrete actions if the system is to be 
protected against further contagion.  
 
The current political stalemate on the way forward, 
moreover, gives the impression of Europe’s leaders 
being in denial of the fact that no country is immune 
to the risk inherent in the crisis. The failure of last 
week’s German bond auction to attract enough 
buyers should have made this clear. The risk is a 
common one and must, therefore, be carried 
collectively through the creation of a credible 
backstop mechanism for the debt mountain. This 
could take the shape of Eurobonds, allowing an 
expanded EFSF to buy bonds in the secondary market 
or creating a Redemption Fund. Denying the need for 
such a backstop stands in stark contrast to repeated 
statements that everything will be done to defend 
the euro. This inconsistency only serves to undermine 
market confidence even further. 
 
It is not enough, therefore, to pay lip service to the 
principle of solidarity. The strong must help the 
weak, not only because this is one of the 
fundamental values upon which the EU is built, but 
also because it is in their own interest. It needs to be 
better understood that, given the high degree of 
 
M i c h a e l  B o n e l l o  –  T h e  E u r o  
 
 
 
Page 6 
economic and financial interdependence in today’s 
world, the survival of the Union and of the euro is in 
the interest of each member.  
 
Finally, this also applies to those countries, mainly 
outside the euro area, who argue against further 
European integration. They would do well to look 
beyond narrow national interests and take a longer-
term view. Europe is shrinking and ageing. It is 
estimated that by the middle of this century we will 
account for only about 7% of the world’s population 
and 10% of global value added. Viewed in this 
perspective, the current crisis represents a threat not 
just for the euro, but indeed for the economic 
wellbeing of many future generations of Europeans. 
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